

January 5, 2020

Vice President Michael R. Pence
Office of the Vice President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Vice President Pence:

The 2020 election witnessed an unprecedented and admitted defiance of state law and procedural irregularities raising questions about the validity of hundreds of thousands of ballots in our respective states.

The attached appendix summarizes the illegalities present in the 2020 election and provides evidence of a coordinated and structured multi-state effort to undermine state law protecting election integrity.

State legislative bodies have the constitutional authority and responsibility to determine the time, place and manner of elections and the selection of presidential electors. Yet, to date, we have been unable to fulfill those responsibilities in the 2020 Presidential election.

The refusal by state executive branch and local officials to comply with reasonable legislative investigation requests, as well as their obfuscation and intentional deception have prevented proper investigation. Moreover, in some instances, state executives have acted to prevent legislatures from meeting as a body and in Michigan, threatened legislators with criminal investigation for meeting to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities.

We intend on fulfilling our oaths of office by properly investigating and determining whether the election should be certified, or decertified, by our respective state legislatures. Additional time must be afforded for the legislatures to meet and for state legislators to fulfill their constitutional duties.

On January 6, 2021, you are statutorily authorized and required under the Electoral Count Act of 1887 to preside over both houses of Congress to count and record the Presidential electoral vote count to elect the President and Vice President of the United States. This congressionally set deadline, however, is not the supreme law of the land, and in fact must not supersede our state legislative authority under the Constitution. Moreover, the deadline is not necessitated by circumstances, especially when it truncates the fulfillment of our constitutional duties and our responsibility to the American people.

There are extensive and well-founded accusations of electoral administration mismanagement and deliberate and admitted violations of explicit election laws enacted by state legislatures in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

Therefore, we write to ask you to comply with our reasonable request to afford our nation more time to properly review the 2020 election by postponing the January 6th opening and counting of the electoral votes for at least 10 days, affording our respective bodies to meet, investigate, and as a body vote on

certification or decertification of the election. This action can be completed prior to the inauguration date, as required by the Constitution.

American elections must be transparent, inclusive and produce results in which the American people have faith. The 2020 election, thus far, has failed in this respect. Your actions consistent with this request can repair this failing.

Sincerely,

Alexander, Julie	MI	Rep.	Cox, Jim	PA	Rep.
Argall, Dave	PA	Senator	Davanzo, Eric	PA	Rep.
Barr, Timothy	GA	Rep.	Diamond, Russ	PA	Rep.
Barto, Nancy	AZ	Rep.	Dunahoo, Emory	GA	Rep.
Barton, Brenda	AZ	Rep.	Dush, Cris	PA	Senator
Beach, Brandon	GA	Senator	Eisen, Gary	MI	Rep.
Bernstine, Aaron	PA	Rep.	Fillmore, John	AZ	Rep.
Bolick, Shawwna	AZ	Rep.	Finchem, Mark	AZ	Rep.
Borowicz, Stephanie	PA	Rep.	Gilligan, Sheri	GA	Rep.
Borrelli, Sonny	AZ	Senator	Gliem, Barbra	PA	Rep.
Borton, Ken	MI	Rep.	Gowan, David	AZ	Senator
Brandtjen, Janel	WI	Rep.	Grantham, Travis	AZ	Rep.
Brooks, Robert	PA	Rep.	Griffin, Beth	MI	Rep.
Brooks, Robert	WI	Rep.	Griffin, Gail	AZ	Rep.
Carra, Steve	MI	Rep.	Gundrum, Rick	WI	Rep.
Clark, David	GA	Rep.	Gurtler, Matt	GA	Rep.
Cook, Bud	PA	Rep.	Horlacher, Cody	WI	Rep.
Jones, Burt	GA	Senator	Jacque, André	WI	Senator
Jones, Jeff	GA	Rep.	Jones, Burt	GA	Senator
Jones, Mike	PA	Rep.	Jones, Jeff	GA	Rep.
Kasier, Steve	AZ	Rep.	Jones, Mike	PA	Rep.
Kauffman, Rob	PA	Rep.	Kasier, Steve	AZ	Rep.

Keefer, Dawn	PA	Rep.	Rendon, Daire	MI	Rep.
Kern, Anthony	AZ	Rep.	Rigby, Jim	PA	Rep.
Knodl, Dan	WI	Rep.	Roae, Brad	PA	Rep.
Langerholc Jr, Wayne	PA	Senator	Rowe, David	PA	Rep.
Ligon, William	GA	Senator	Ryan, Francis	PA	Rep.
Maddock, Matt	MI	Rep.	Sanfelippo, Joe	WI	Rep.
Magnafici, Gae	WI	Rep.	Schraa, Michael	WI	Rep.
Maloney, David	PA	Rep.	Silvis, Jason	PA	Rep.
Mastriano, Doug	PA	Senator	Singleton, Philip	GA	Rep.
Meerman, Luke	MI	Rep.	Smith, Brian	PA	Rep.
Metcalfe, Daryl	PA	Rep.	Sortwell, Shae	WI	Rep.
Montenegro, Steve	AZ	Senator	Thiesfeldt, Jeremy	WI	Rep.
Moul, Dan	PA	Rep.	Thompson, Bruce	GA	Senator
Murphy, Dave	WI	Rep.	Townsend, Kelly	AZ	Rep.
Mursau, Jeff	WI	Rep.	Ward, Judy	PA	Senator
Nelson, Eric	PA	Rep.	Ward, Kim	PA	Senator
Payne, Kevin	AZ	Rep.	Whiteford, Mary	MI	Rep.
Petersen, Warren	AZ	Senator	Wichgers, Chuck	WI	Rep.
Phillips-Hill, Kristin	PA	Senator	Wilmeth, Justin	AZ	Rep.
Pittman, Joe	PA	Senator	Wozniak, Doug	MI	Rep.
Pullin, Ken	GA	Rep.	Zimmerman, David	PA	Rep.
Puskaric, Michael	PA	Rep.			
Ramthun, Timothy	WI	Rep.			
Rapp, Kathy	PA	Rep.			
Regan, Mike	PA	Senator			
Reilly, John	MI	Rep.			



BOUGHT AND SOLD FOR BIG TECH **GOLD:**

How an Unprecedented Private-Public
Partnership Subverted the 2020 Election

By Phill Kline, Director, The Amistad Project of the Thomas More Society




THE AMISTAD
Journey

Private Information of Citizens Traded by Government for Private Monies

The 2020 presidential election witnessed an unprecedented, coordinated public-private partnership to improperly influence the election results on behalf of one particular candidate and party.

Funded by hundreds of millions of dollars from Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and other interests, activist organizations created a two-tiered election system that treated voters differently depending on whether they lived in Democrat or Republican strongholds.




Private monies dictated that city and county election officials manage the election in ways contrary to both federal law and state election plans endorsed and developed by state legislatures with authority granted by the United States Constitution¹

Moreover, executive officials in swing states facilitated, through unique and novel contracts, the sharing of private and sensitive information about citizens within those states with private interests, some of whom actively promote leftist candidates and agendas.²

This data sharing allowed direct access to data of unique political value to leftist causes, and created new vulnerabilities for digital manipulation of state electronic poll books and counting systems and machines.

This public-private partnership in these swing states effectively placed the government's thumb on the scale to help these private interests achieve their objectives and to benefit the candidates of one political party.

Public-Private Partnership Operates Shadow Government Undermining Election Integrity



The Amistad Project began monitoring these activities beginning in the spring of 2019, initially focusing on the digital vulnerabilities of state election systems.

Amistad became aware that states and local election officials failed to maintain the legal right to access the computer logs from the machines counting ballots. The first step to engage any computer forensic examination is to gain access to machine logs, yet scores of election officials failed to maintain the right to even review such information, much less establish a method for bipartisan review.

In effect, America purchased a complex ballot box (computer) into which its votes would be deposited, but didn't have the right to open the box and review the count. A secret ballot helps secure free and fair elections — a secret ballot box fundamentally undermines them.

As COVID escalated in March of 2020, The Amistad Project also began witnessing troubling efforts to undermine the integrity of the 2020 election by assaulting laws designed to protect the integrity of the absentee ballot.

The use of absentee ballots is uniquely vulnerable to fraud, as detailed in a special bipartisan congressional report authored by former President Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James Baker.³

In-person voting occurs with trained election officials present. These officials deter voter intimidation and coercion and are trained to educate, not mislead, the voter when completing the ballot. Moreover, in-person voting allows for voter identification. When the ballot leaves government controls, new challenges are present. There are few identity checks and no assurance the ballot was completed without intimidation, coercion, inducement, or by a person other than the voter.

Accordingly, states have basic, common-sense laws protecting the integrity of the absentee, advance, or mailed ballot.

The Assault was Coordinated and Planned

Beginning in the spring of 2020, left-leaning organizations filed a massive number of lawsuits to challenge these integrity laws. Lawsuits sought to set aside witness requirements, identification requirements, deadlines, delivery requirements, ballot deadlines, signature requirements, application requirements, and even argued that the Constitution required all returned ballot envelopes be postage prepaid due to COVID.⁴

Swing state governors also started issuing emergency executive orders shutting down in-person voting while pouring new state resources into encouraging persons to vote in advance.⁵


Polling data revealed this coordinated assault on in-person voting generally favored Democrat Party voters who preferred to vote in advance, while placing Republicans, who preferred to vote in person, at a disadvantage.⁶

These actions represent the beginning of the formation of a two-tier election system favoring one demographic while disadvantaging another demographic.

Also, in March 2020, David Plouffe, former campaign manager for President Barack Obama, published his book entitled *A Citizen's Guide to Defeating Donald Trump*. At the time, Plouffe was working for the charitable initiative of Mark Zuckerberg and his wife Priscilla Chan.

Plouffe correctly identifies that the 2020 general election will come down to a “block by block street fight” to turn out the vote in the urban core, a key stronghold of Democrat Party votes. Plouffe specifically highlighted high turn-outs in Milwaukee, Detroit, and Philadelphia as the key to a Democrat victory.⁷

Soon after, we witnessed the rumblings of a previously sleepy 501(c)(3) organization called the Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL), whose previous annual revenues never exceeded \$1.2 million.⁸



America: A Facebook Company


CTCL began sending agents into states to recruit certain Democrat strongholds to take grants from the organization — and to recruit other Democrat strongholds to do the same. These grants provided funds for election staff and resources in return for administering the election in a manner dictated by CTCL.

For example, CTCL inked a \$100,000 grant to the Mayor of Racine, WI in May of 2020 directing the Mayor to recruit four other cities (Green Bay, Kenosha, Madison, and Milwaukee) to develop a joint grant request of

CTCL.⁹ This effort results in these cities submitting a “Wisconsin Safe Election Plan” on June 15, 2020 to CTCL and, in turn, receiving \$6.3 million to implement the plan.¹⁰ This privatization of elections undermined the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which requires state election plans to be submitted to federal officials and approved, and requires respect for equal protection by making all resources available equally to all voters.¹¹

The provision of Zuckerberg-CTCL funds allowed these Democrat strongholds to spend roughly \$47 per voter, compared to \$4 to \$7 per voter in traditionally Republican areas of the state.¹²

The chart below represents early CTCL grants to swing states. Early money is of much greater value than money late in an election cycle because it can be purposed consistent with a plan. CTCL funded and dictated election planning in Democratic Party strongholds through the summer of 2020 and only later, in response to criticism, began moving smaller amounts of monies to Republican areas.



STATE	# CTCL GRANTS	TOTAL CTCL GRANT AMOUNT
Michigan	8	\$6,106,599
Wisconsin	6	\$7,324,567
Pennsylvania	5	\$13,237,557
Georgia	2	\$11,600,000

Zuckerberg's indirect manner of dictating county and city election policy presented difficulty in learning the full scope of his activities. Government action is subject to laws ensuring transparency such as open records acts and the requirement for public meetings and audits. Such is not the case with private entities.

Neither Mr. Zuckerberg nor CTCL are subject to such requirements, nor should they be. Government should not be able to require such private information from private organizations. But allowing a private organization to effectively manage a government function gifted a cloak of secrecy over government action allowing these local officials with CTCL and a compliant and/or overworked or lazy media to control the narrative.

CTCL grants were reported as providing a safe election environment when, in reality, the focus was on increasing turnout in Democratic strongholds through inducements and eliminating integrity measures on absentee ballots.

This chart reflects all grants we were able to track and constitute early monies to democrat strongholds. Facing criticism, CTCL attempted to explain away this compelling evidence of partisanship by, for example, stating that in Pennsylvania CTCL gave more grants to counties carried by Donald Trump in 2016 (13 counties) than counties carried by Hillary Clinton (8 counties). This is technically true, however, these grants only represent 22% of the 59 Pennsylvania counties carried by Trump and 100% of the eight counties carried by Clinton. Moreover, the grants to the Clinton counties involved substantially more funds. Our difficulty in tracking and obtaining the truth about this effort is compounded by CTCL's refusal to be transparent and the fact that CTCL remains beyond the reach of public transparency laws.

Jurisdiction	CTCL Grant	Total Votes	Clinton	Trump	Clinton Win	Trump Win	Clinton %	Trump %	Difference %
Dallas County, TX	\$15,130,433	724,025	461,080	262,945	198,135	-	60.22%	34.34%	25.88%
City of Philadelphia, PA	\$10,016,074	692,773	584,025	108,748	475,277	-	82.30%	15.32%	66.98%
Harris County, TX	\$9,600,000	1,253,869	707,914	545,955	161,959	-	55.04%	42.39%	12.65%
Fulton County, GA	\$6,000,000	414,834	297,051	117,783	179,268	-	67.70%	26.85%	40.85%
Cobb County, GA	\$5,600,000	313,033	160,121	152,912	7,209	-	47.93%	45.77%	2.16%
DeKalb County, GA	\$4,800,000	302,838	251,370	51,468	199,902	-	79.08%	16.19%	62.89%
City of Detroit, MI	\$3,512,000	242,553	234,871	7,682	227,189	-	94.95%	3.11%	91.84%
Burlington County, NJ	\$2,900,000	210,997	121,725	89,272	32,453	-	55.60%	40.77%	14.83%
Camden County, NJ	\$2,900,000	219,348	146,717	72,631	74,086	-	64.06%	31.71%	32.35%
City of Minneapolis, MN	\$2,297,342	200,278	174,585	25,693	148,892	-	79.42%	11.69%	67.73%
Delaware County, PA	\$2,200,000	288,069	177,402	110,667	66,735	-	59.27%	36.97%	22.30%
City of Milwaukee, WI	\$2,164,500	233,820	188,653	45,167	143,486	-	76.55%	18.43%	58.12%
Allegheny County, PA	\$2,052,251	626,059	366,934	259,125	107,809	-	55.93%	39.50%	16.43%
St. Louis County, MO	\$2,048,474	489,138	286,704	202,434	84,270	-	55.80%	39.50%	16.30%
Bexar County, TX	\$1,900,000	559,883	319,550	240,333	79,217	-	53.74%	40.42%	13.32%
Cameron County, TX	\$1,800,000	88,874	59,402	29,472	29,930	-	64.10%	31.80%	32.30%
City of Green Bay, WI	\$1,625,600	41,112	21,291	19,821	1,470	-	48.01%	44.70%	3.31%
Hinds County, MS	\$1,500,000	92,869	67,594	25,275	42,319	-	71.39%	26.69%	44.70%
City of Madison, WI	\$1,281,788	143,131	120,078	23,053	97,025	-	79.51%	15.26%	64.25%
City of St. Louis, MO	\$1,034,200	125,067	104,235	20,832	83,403	-	79.70%	15.90%	63.80%
City of Racine, WI	\$1,002,100	27,963	19,029	8,934	10,095	-	64.26%	30.17%	34.09%
Total:	\$81,364,762	7,290,533	4,870,331	2,420,202	2,450,129	-	66.41%	28.93%	37.48%

In documents received by The Amistad Project pursuant to court order, CTCL demands Philadelphia increase the number of polling places from 190 in the primary election to 800 in the general election.¹³

The August 21, 2020 CTCL-Philadelphia grant agreement states “[t]he City and the Commissioners shall work to secure 800 or more in-person polling places on Election Day [and] to (sic) extent the goals...are not met, the City shall communicate to grantor the number of polling places, rationale for opening fewer than 800 polling places, the approximate and average and maximum distance between a registered voter’s residence and their assigned polling place, a description of all courses of action or plans undertaken to open 800 or more polling places, and why each such course of action was not successful.”¹⁴

Philadelphia failing to meet any of CTCL’s demands was not an option as the grant agreement, as all CTCL grants, contained a “claw-back” provision. “CTCL may discontinue, withhold part of, or request the return all or part of any unspent grant funds if it determines, that any of the above conditions have not been met.”¹⁵

This dramatic increase in “in-person” polling locations in Democrat strongholds such as Philadelphia, Detroit and Milwaukee, as outlined in Plouffe’s book occurred at the same time blue state Governors were shutting down in-person voting in other areas of the state. For example, in Michigan, Governor Whitmer issued Executive Order 2020-27 pertaining to the Michigan primary in which she reduced the number of “in-person” polling places required by each jurisdiction to one¹⁶, stating “[t]o mitigate the spread of COVID-19, to protect public health...it is crucial that all Michiganders take steps to limit in-person contact. To that end, it is reasonable and necessary to temporarily suspend rules and procedures relating to the May 5, 2020 elections....”¹⁷

COVID Fear and the Litigation Strategy of the Left and Zuckerboxes Open the Door to Fraud

Accordingly, as blue state executive officials warned of in-person voting and the left launched a massive litigation strategy to remove ballot integrity provisions relating to absentee ballots¹⁸ including arguing that the presence of COVID requires the government to pay for return postage of all ballots.

In *Stringer v. North Carolina*, filed by the Right to Vote Foundation and the National Redistricting Foundation, 23-year-old Harvard graduate Sarah Fellman demanded that the state pay the postage on her absentee ballot as she “is admittedly confused about how much postage her ballot requires, given that absentee ballot envelopes are large and might weigh more than one ounce.” In the Complaint, Ms. Fellman explained “[i]n the past, she had had to ask friends for postage or try to fit a trip to her local post office into her busy schedule” and that in light of COVID-19 she “expects that the Postage Requirement will become even more burdensome than it has been for her in the past.”¹⁹

The Fellman suit also sought to suspend absentee ballot receipt deadlines, witness requirements, signature comparisons, and rejections of absentee ballots based on such comparisons unless curing is provided.²⁰ “Taken together,” the suit reads, “these restrictions on mail ballots are at best unduly burdensome and pose significant risks to voters’ health and safety, and, at worst, impossible to comply with during a global pandemic...”²¹

Yet, all such protections on the integrity of the absentee ballot previously received bipartisan support and were viewed as common sense requirements due to the potential fraud present when a ballot leaves the hands of election officials and is cast outside of an in-person polling place.

In 2005, former President Jimmy Carter and Republican James Baker authored a report from the bipartisan Commission on Federal Election Reform²² concluding, “[t]o improve ballot integrity...[and] to deter or prosecute systemic efforts to deceive or intimidate voters [s]tates...need to do more to prevent registration and absentee ballot fraud.”²³ Fraud occurs in several ways. Absentee ballots remain the largest source of potential voter fraud.”²⁴

The report specifically warned that mail voting is “likely to increase the risks of fraud...where safeguards for ballot integrity are weaker” and that such “absentee balloting...has been one of the major sources of fraud.”²⁵ The report also warns that allowing voting far in advance of Election Day results in voters not having comparable information about the candidates or the issues at the time they vote.²⁶ This, of course, diminishes the potential for an informed electorate and informed vote.

These concerns are logical. Once the ballot leaves the hands of government officials and is cast away from the polling place, there is not anyone present to ensure the voter is not misled, intimidated, or coerced to vote a specific way, or to ensure it was the voter who actually completed the ballot. It is for this reason that states enacted common sense integrity measures.

Yet the left’s litigation strategy sought to weaken all such provisions. Much of this occurred through “friendly” litigation. In Virginia, the League of Women Voters sued the Commonwealth seeking a court order removing the witness requirement for the absentee ballot. Paragraph 1 of the Complaint in *League of Women Voters, et. al. v. Virginia State Board of Elections*, quotes Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring stating that such witness requirements are dangerous during a pandemic. It is Herring’s office that is tasked with defending the state law requiring absentee ballot witnesses and Herring almost immediately announced he would settle the suit by granting the League what it sought, the removal of the witness requirement.

“We are thrilled that today’s agreement means voters will not bear the burden of finding a witness for their absentee ballots during a global pandemic...so that Virginia voters do not have to choose between their health and their vote,” harped Deb Wake, president of the League of Women Voters of Virginia.²⁷

A similar lawsuit resulted in Georgia’s Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger agreeing to settle with the Democratic Party of Georgia to alter Georgia’s signature comparison requirement.²⁸ Raffensperger entered the agreement without legislative approval.

Funding the Willful Violation of State Election Integrity Laws

Moreover, this recruiting of targeted jurisdictions for specific government action and funding runs contrary to legislative election plans and invites the government to play favorites in the election process.

The “Wisconsin Safe Election Plan” was not authored by the state and considered state election integrity laws as obstacles and nuisances to be ignored or circumvented. CTCL retained the right, in the grant document, to, in its sole discretion, order all funds returned if the grantee cities did not conduct the election consistent with CTCL dictates.²⁹

Effectively, CTCL managed the election in these five cities. And this plan violated state law in, at least, the following ways:

- 1. The plan circumvented voter identification requirements for absentee ballots by attempting to classify voters as “indefinitely confined” due to COVID and later, after Wisconsin Supreme Court criticism, by ordering election clerks to not question such claims.*
- 2. The plan initiated the use of drop boxes for ballot collection, significantly breaching the chain of custody of the ballot and failing to maintain proper logs and reviews to ensure all properly cast ballots were counted and all improperly cast ballots were not counted.*
- 3. Initiated the consolidation of counting centers, justifying the flow of hundreds of thousands of ballots to one location and the marginalization of Republican poll watchers such that bipartisan participation in the management, handling, and counting of the ballots was compromised.*

These are but examples of radical changes in election processes that opened the door for significant fraud.

The disparate impact of Zuckerberg funding is also present in the analysis of CTCL funding in Pennsylvania. Documents obtained through court order revealed communication between the City of Philadelphia and CTCL emphasizing that CTCL paid election judges in Philadelphia and other election officials. CTCL mandated Philadelphia to increase its polling locations and to use drop boxes and eventually mobile pick-up units.³⁰ Moreover, Zuckerberg monies allowed Philadelphia to “cure” absentee ballots in a manner not provided for in Republican areas of the state.

In Democrat Delaware County, Pennsylvania, one drop box was placed every four square miles and for every 4,000 voters. In the 59 counties carried by Trump in 2016, there was one drop box for every 1,100 square miles and every 72,000 voters.³¹ Government encouraging a targeted demographic to turn out the vote is the opposite side of the same coin as government targeting a demographic to suppress the vote.

This two-tiered election system allowed voters in Democrat strongholds to stroll down the street to vote while voters in Republican strongholds had to go on the equivalent of a “Where’s Waldo?” hunt in order to find a ballot box.

These irregularities existed wherever Zuckerberg’s money was granted to local election officials. In effect, Mark Zuckerberg was invited into the counting room, and the American people were kicked out.



CENTER FOR
TECH AND
CIVIC LIFE

August 21, 2020

City of Philadelphia
Office of the Director of Finance
1401 John F. Kennedy Blvd. Ste 1330
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102

To whom it may concern:

I am pleased to inform you that the Center for Tech and Civic Life (“CTCL”) has awarded the City of Philadelphia (“City”) a grant to support its work in connection with the safe administration of elections in 2020 (the “Grant”).

The following is a description of the Grant:

AMOUNT OF GRANT: Ten million, sixteen thousand and seventy-four US dollars (USD \$10,016,074).

PURPOSE: The Grant funds must be used exclusively for the public purpose of planning and operationalizing safe and secure election administration in the City of Philadelphia in accordance with the attached Philadelphia Safe Voting Plan 2020.

Before we transmit these funds, we ask that you sign this agreement promising to use the Grant funds in compliance with United States tax laws. Specifically, by signing this letter on behalf of the City you confirm and agree to the following:

Your acceptance of these agreements should be indicated below. Please have an authorized representative of The City of Philadelphia sign below, and return a scanned copy of this letter to us by email at grants@techandcivicle.org.

On behalf of CTCL, I extend my best wishes in your work.

Sincerely,


Tiana Epps Johnson
Executive Director
Center for Tech and Civic Life

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

By: Ashley Del Bianco

Title: Ashley Del Bianco, Chief Grants Officer

Date: 8/21/20


CENTER FOR TECH & CIVIC LIFE
HELLO@TECHANDCIVICLE.ORG
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The Hack from Within

Additionally, Amistad became alarmed at the new vulnerabilities created in our election system with “data sharing agreements” that gave left-leaning third-party organizations front door access to electronic poll books.³²

Rock the Vote and other organizations inked agreements with blue state election officials to enter new registrations into state poll books. Such agreements are unprecedented and unwise.

The threat of unofficial voter registration drives was acknowledged in the Carter-Baker 2005 report which called for “legislation to minimize fraud in voter registration, particularly to prevent abuse by third-party organizations [by] direct[ing] offices to check the identify of individuals registered through third-party registration drives and to track voter registration forms.”³³

These concerns were articulated at a time when such third-party voter registration drives required private interests to complete voter registration applications on paper and turn the applications into the local election clerk.

In the 2020 election all of this changed in a manner opening the door to a front-end hack of our election poll books. Previously, voter registrations were entered solely by election clerks, who have three important checks on their authority. These checks are: 1) they must be transparent subject to FOIA and open records laws; 2) they are geographically limited rendering audits manageable; and 3) they are politically accountable. No such checks apply to Rock the Vote.

Allowing such access creates new digital vulnerabilities, easily allowing nefarious actors to access poll books and alter entries.

Sufficient data is available from private vendors to create identifies to populate poll books. Vendors sell the changes of address, legal name changes, divorce, marriage, death, and other databases which combined allow for the creation of fictitious voters. As an example, a colleague of mine checked the Michigan voter registration records after concerns arose about voter fraud in Michigan to see if she was registered in her birth state. She now lives in Virginia. To her astonishment, she found she was registered under her birth name – a name under which she never registered in any state as she legally changed her first name upon reaching the age of majority, later married and had not lived in Michigan for decades.

The Amistad Project's concerns were amplified by the nature of a contract offered by Michigan's health director to a subsidiary of NGP VAN, a Democrat fundraiser and data services company.

Michigan granted the COVID tracing contract to EveryAction VAN, a subsidiary of NGP VAN which Governor Whitmer, AG Dana Nessel and Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson as a fundraising consultant for their campaigns.³⁴

The contract allowed this leftist organization to demand sensitive information from Michigan citizens at the threat of arrest. Citizens could be ordered to turn over medical records, travel information, the names of associates and friends, and other information with a significant privacy interest and of significant monetary value to a political fundraiser.

Emails later obtained through FOIA requests demonstrate Ed Duggan, a Whitmer advisor and the Michigan Director for the Biden campaign, helped arrange the contract.³⁵ Duggan suggested that health department officials not directly contract with NGP VAN because of possible political fallout.³⁶ When this information became public, Whitmer claimed she was unaware of the agreement and faced with public pressure, she rescinded the contract.³⁷

Consolidated County Centers Combine with Dropboxes to Open the Door to Hundreds of Thousands of Fraudulent Ballots

CTCL and swing state urban election officials justified consolidating counting centers due to COVID. Previously, ballots on Election Day were generally managed in smaller locations with easy bipartisan access.

It is doubtful consolidation of the counting centers, drawing crowds of poll watchers and workers, is at all helpful in preventing the spread of COVID. But the centers did allow for two things to happen: 1) the delivery of hundreds of thousands of ballots to one location; and 2) preventing members of one political party from observing the receipt, handling, management, curing, casting, and counting of ballots.

Transparency in elections is a hallmark of a fair election. Transparency is achieved through inclusion. The United States Agency for International Development explains that “[t]he most fundamental principle defining credible elections is that they must reflect the free expression of the will of the people. To achieve this, elections should be transparent, inclusive, and accountable....”³⁸

The agency implements strategies which involve the presence of independent observers, audits, and inclusion of all political factions in witnessing election management.³⁹

Transparency is so significant that the Carter-Baker report devoted a section to “Election Observation” and recommended election observers should be allowed to “visit any polling station in any state and to view all parts of the election process, including the testing of voting equipment, the processing of absentee ballots, and the vote count.”⁴⁰

Yet, this did not happen in 2020. Rather, Democrat officials in the cities identified as critical to defeating President Trump used the consolidation of the counting facilities to exclude Republican poll watchers from the ability to observe the election process while claiming technical compliance with the law.

In Wayne County, Michigan (Detroit), centralized counting was hosted in the TCF Center which had 134 tables of election inspectors in one giant room. State law requires an official from both major political parties be present in the “place” of the counting. This is necessary because the election inspectors complete and cast ballots third parties who are not present.

Such action for third parties occurs if ballots are damaged or for some reason are not able to be read by the optical scanners that tabulate the votes. In such circumstances, inspectors take pristine ballots and fill out the blank ballots consistent with the voter’s intent on the damaged or faulty ballot. Having representatives of both parties present ensures the completion of the replacement ballot is accomplished with fidelity to the voter’s intent.

At TCF, Republican poll watchers were kept at great distances away from the inspector tables such that they were unable to verify the proper treatment of the ballots. Democrat officials, however, argued their treatment of Republican poll watchers was consistent with state law as a Republican was in the “place” of the counting. Similar arguments were made in all Democrat strongholds with CTCL funding and consolidated counting centers.

Moreover, the egregious breach in ballot chain of custody created by the presence of drop boxes and consolidated counting centers and the exclusion of the representatives of one political party opened the door to the sudden infusion of hundreds of thousands of ballots in these various centers in the early morning hours of November 4.

On October 21, USPS subcontractor and whistleblower Jesse Morgan picked up between 140,000-280,000 completed absentee ballots at a postal facility in Bethpage, New York and was directed to deliver these ballots into Pennsylvania. After experiencing several anomalies on postal procedure, Morgan was ordered to drive his trailer containing the ballots to Lancaster, Pennsylvania and unhook and leave the trailer. When Jesse returned the next day, his trailer and the ballots had disappeared.⁴¹

Mr. Morgan’s account has been corroborated by a dock worker at the Bethpage facility who stated that after filing a complaint that “multiple times” ballots were being shipped from the facility, she was ordered to simply do her job and “get the ballots” to her location.

The dock worker complained because the Bethpage postal facility in question is not able to process or receive such mail. Moreover, there is no logical reason for completed ballots in bulk to be shipped across state lines.

In the early morning hours of November 4, poll watcher Greg Stenstrom was watching from a distance when he observed tens of thousands of ballots entering the counting facility stacked vertically in bulk mail trays, packaged in the same manner as Mr. Morgan described the ballots were packaged in Bethpage.

Mr. Morgan, Mr. Stenstrom, and the Bethpage dock worker join numerous others who have highlighted questionable conduct at postal facilities in New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan.

These late-night and early morning ballot dumps in the Plouffe-identified and CT-CL-funded consolidated counting centers, many after work stoppages, created several statistical anomalies.⁴²

Later, data analysis by Rep. Frank Ryan (R-PA) and a team of data analysts revealed that the Pennsylvania election data shows 202,377 more ballots were counted than voters who voted in the 2020 election, a number remarkably similar to the number of ballots on Jesse Morgan's trailer.⁴³

Conclusion

Managing elections is a core government function that cannot be trusted to private interests. We must not privatize our elections. Such privatization threatens democracy, silences the voice of the electorate, and undermines election integrity. These concerns should transcend party affiliation and this threat requires a bipartisan response.

Yet the left's shadow government of private interests managing the election in the urban core controlled the following election systems:

- **Poll book software and encryption services**
(Center for Election Innovation and Research (received \$50 million from CTCL))
- **Electronic voter registration**
- **Funding election judges, poll workers and facilities**
- **Purchase of tabulation machines and equipment**
- **Purchase, provision, and location of ballot dropboxes**
- **Funding of consolidated counting centers**
- **Ballot design, barcode technology, and distribution.**

These private interests were funded by and managed by persons with demonstrated hostility to President Trump. The combined efforts, justified by COVID and utilizing blue state official executive orders, friendly and hostile litigation, willful and intentional defiance of state law by local elected officials, and dominantly funded by Mark Zuckerberg opened the door for nefarious players to commit election fraud.

The evidence is overwhelming and available publicly from numerous sources, including www.got-freedom.org/evidence.

The irregularities and radical alteration of election procedures is undeniable. The similarity of these alterations in the urban core of the swing states, all receiving CTCL-Zuckerberg funding, provides strong evidence of coordination and planning. Yet, some of the most compelling evidence remains the defiant statements and conduct of election officials who refuse audits, have ordered destruction of information, and defied legislative subpoenas.

Such defiance underscores the weakness of our election laws, which do not provide for a meaningful review of election official conduct nor the results. In most instances, state election laws place an undue burden on candidates, restrict third-party and independent involvement, and do not apply scientific principles to election recounts or audits. In fact, such election contests and reviews merely validate any fraud, rather than reveal the presence of fraud.

These legal loopholes joined with open defiance of law to create serious doubts the 2020 election reflects the will of the electorate.

Phill Kline, Director of the Amistad Project of the Thomas More Society

Footnotes

- ¹ The Legitimacy and Effect of Private Funding in Federal and State Electoral Processes, pp. 7-10
- ² The Legitimacy and Effect of Private Funding in Federal and State Electoral Processes, p. 6
- ³ Building Confidence in U.S. Elections, 2005
- ⁴ Timeline of Electoral Policy Activities, Issues, and Litigation, pp. 4-19
- ⁵ Timeline of Electoral Policy Activities, Issues, and Litigation, pp. 3-19
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- ⁷ Plouffe, David, A Citizen's Guide to Defeating Donald Trump [New York: Viking, 2020], p. 81
- ⁸ [https://ballotpedia.org/Center_for_Tech_and_Civic_Life_\(CTCL\)](https://ballotpedia.org/Center_for_Tech_and_Civic_Life_(CTCL))
- ⁹ Racine CTCL grant approval letter <https://got-freedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/5-3-Appx3.pdf>
- ¹⁰ The Legitimacy and Effect of Private Funding in Federal and State Electoral Processes, Appendix B:
<https://got-freedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/The-Legitimacy-and-Effect-of-Private-Funding-in-Federal-and-State-Electoral-Processes-1.pdf>
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- ¹³ Racine CTCL grant approval letter <https://got-freedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/5-3-Appx3.pdf>
- ¹⁴ Philadelphia CTCL grant approval letter https://www.philadelphiavotes.com/images/stories/execution_copy_philadelphia_ctcl_grant_ad_signed-082120.pdf
- ¹⁵ The Legitimacy and Effect of Private Funding in Federal and State Electoral Processes, p. 5 <https://got-freedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/The-Legitimacy-and-Effect-of-Private-Funding-in-Federal-and-State-Electoral-Processes-1.pdf>
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23 Id., at v.

24 Id., at 46.

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28 Compromise Settlement Agreement and Release; <https://demdoc2.perkinscoieblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/2020/07/GA-Settlement-1.pdf>.

29 Racine CTCL grant approval letter

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32 The Legitimacy and Effect of Private Funding in Federal and State Electoral Processes, p. 11

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
41 I interviewed Jesse Morgan in his home in late November. The forensic interview was videotaped, and Jesse's statements were later reduced to a sworn affidavit which he signed under oath and is available on request.

42 See, e.g., 2020 Presidential Election Startling Vote Spikes (rev. 1-3-21), Eric Quinnel, Stan Young, Tony Cox, Tom Davis, Ray Blehar and John Drox.

43 See, e.g., PA Lawmakers: Numbers Don't Add Up Certification of Presidential Results Premature and In Error; <http://www.repfrankryan.com/News/18754/Latest-News/PA-Lawmakers-Numbers-Don%E2%80%99t-Add-Up,-Certification-of-Presidential-Results-Premature-and-In-Error>.



THE AMISTAD *Journey*



The Legitimacy and Effect of Private Funding in Federal and State Electoral Processes

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Executive Summary

The 2020 presidential election witnessed an unprecedented and coordinated public-private partnership to improperly influence the 2020 presidential election on behalf of one particular candidate and party.

Funded by hundreds of millions of dollars from Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and other high-tech interests, activist organizations created a two-tiered election system that treated voters differently depending on whether they lived in Democrat or Republican strongholds.

Private monies dictated city and county election management contrary to both federal law and state election plans endorsed and developed by state legislatures with authority granted by the United States Constitution.

Moreover, executive officials in swing states facilitated, through unique and novel contracts, the sharing of private and sensitive information about citizens within those states with private interests, some whom actively promote leftist candidates and agendas.

This data sharing allowed direct access to data of unique political value to leftist causes, and created new vulnerabilities for digital manipulation of state electronic poll books and counting systems and machines.

This public-private partnership in these swing states effectively placed government's thumb on the scale to help these private interests achieve their objectives and to benefit the candidates of one political party.

The Amistad Project began monitoring these activities beginning in the spring of 2019, originally focusing on the digital vulnerabilities of state election systems.

Amistad became aware that states and local election officials failed to maintain the legal right to access computer logs on the machines

counting ballots. The first step to engage any computer forensic examination is to gain access to machine logs, yet scores of election officials failed to maintain the right to even review such information, much less establish a method for bipartisan review.

In effect, America purchased a complex ballot box (computer) into which its votes would be deposited, but didn't have the right to open the box and review the count.

As COVID escalated in March of 2020, The Amistad Project began witnessing troubling efforts to undermine the integrity of the 2020 by assaulting laws designed to protect the integrity of the absentee ballot.

The use of absentee ballots is uniquely vulnerable to fraud, as detailed in a special bipartisan congressional report authored by former President Jimmy Carter and James Baker.

In-person voting occurs with trained election officials present. These officials deter voter intimidation and coercion and are trained to educate, not mislead, the voter when completing the ballot. Moreover, in-person voting allows for voter identification. When the ballot leaves government controls, new challenges are present. There are few identity checks and no assurance the ballot was completed without intimidation, coercion, inducement, or by a person other than the voter.

Accordingly, states have basic, common-sense laws protecting the integrity of the absentee, advance, or mailed ballot.

Beginning in the spring of 2020, left-leaning organizations filed a massive number of lawsuits to challenge these integrity laws. Lawsuits sought to set aside witness requirements, identification requirements, deadlines, delivery requirements, ballot deadlines, signature requirements, application requirements, and even argued that the Constitution required all returned ballot envelopes be postage prepaid due to COVID.

Swing state governors also started issuing emergency executive orders shutting down in-person voting while pouring new state resources into encouraging persons to vote in advance.

Polling data revealed this coordinated assault on in-person voting generally favored Democrat Party voters who preferred to vote in advance, while placing Republicans, who preferred to vote in person, at a disadvantage.

These actions represent the beginning of the formation of a two-tier election system favoring one demographic while disadvantaging another demographic.

Also in March 2020, David Plouffe, former campaign manager for President Barak Obama, published his book entitled *A Citizen's Guide to Defeating Donald Trump*. At the time, Plouffe was working for the charitable initiative of Mark Zuckerberg and his wife Priscilla Chan.

On page 81 of his book, Plouffe correctly identifies that the 2020 general election will come down to a “block by block street fight” to turn out the vote in the urban core, a key stronghold of Democrat Party votes. Plouffe specifically highlighted high turnouts in Milwaukee, Detroit, and Philadelphia as the key to a Democrat victory.

Soon after, we witnessed the rumblings of a previously sleepy 501(c)(3) organization entitled the Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL) whose previous annual revenues never exceeded \$1.2 million.

CTCL began sending agents into states to recruit certain Democrat strongholds to prepare grants requesting monies from CTCL.

For example, CTCL inked a \$100,000 grant to the Mayor of Racine, WI in May of 2020 directing the Mayor to recruit four other cities (Green Bay, Kenosha, Madison, and Milwaukee) to develop a joint grant request of CTCL. This effort results in these cities submitting a “Wisconsin Safe Election Plan” on June 15, 2020 to CTCL and, in turn,

receiving \$6.3 million to implement the plan. This privatization of elections undermines the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which requires state election plans to be submitted to federal officials and approved and requires respect for equal protection by making all resources available equally to all voters.

The provision of Zuckerberg-CTCL funds allowed these Democrat strongholds to spend roughly \$47 per voter, compared to \$4 to \$7 per voter in traditionally Republican areas of the state.

Moreover, this recruiting of targeted jurisdictions for specific government action and funding runs contrary to legislative election plans and invites government to play favorites in the election process.

The “Wisconsin Safe Election Plan” was not authored by the state, and considered state election integrity laws as obstacles and nuisances to be ignored or circumvented. Moreover, CTCL retained the right, in the grant document, to, in its sole discretion, order all funds returned if the grantee cities did not conduct the election consistent with CTCL dictates.

Effectively, CTCL managed the election in these five cities. And this plan violated state law in, at least, the following fashion:

- 1) The plan circumvented voter identification requirements for absentee ballots by attempting to classify all voters as “indefinitely confined” due to COVID and later, after Wisconsin Supreme Court criticism, by ordering election clerks to not question such claims.
- 2) The plan initiated the use of drop boxes for ballot collection, significantly breaching the chain of custody of the ballot and failing to maintain proper logs and reviews to ensure all properly cast ballots were counted and all improperly cast ballots were not counted.
- 3) Initiated the consolidation of counting centers, justifying the flow of hundreds of thousands of ballots to one location and the marginalization of Republican poll watchers such that bipartisan

participation in the management, handling, and counting of the ballots was compromised.

These are but examples of radical changes in election processes that opened the door for significant fraud.

The disparate impact of Zuckerberg funding is also present in the analysis of CTCL funding in Pennsylvania. Documents obtained through court order revealed communication between the City of Philadelphia and CTCL emphasizing that CTCL paid election judges in Philadelphia and other election officials. CTCL mandated Philadelphia to increase its polling locations and to use drop boxes and eventually mobile pick-up units. Moreover, Zuckerberg monies allowed Philadelphia to “cure” absentee ballots in a manner not provided for in Republican areas of the state.

In Democrat Delaware County, Pennsylvania, one drop box was placed every four square miles and for every 4,000 voters. In the 59 counties carried by Trump in 2016, there was one drop box for every 1,100 square miles and every 72,000 voters. Government encouraging a targeted demographic to turn out the vote is the opposite side of the same coin as government targeting a demographic to suppress the vote.

This two-tiered election system allowed voters in Democrat strongholds to stroll down the street to vote while voters in Republican strongholds had to go on the equivalent of a “where’s Waldo” hunt.

These irregularities existed wherever Zuckerberg’s money was granted to local election officials. In effect, Mark Zuckerberg was invited into the counting room, and the American people were kicked out.

Additionally, Amistad became alarmed at the new vulnerabilities created in our election system with “data sharing agreements” that gave left-leaning third-party organizations front door access to electronic poll books.

Rock the Vote and other organizations inked agreements with blue state election officials to enter new registrations into state poll books. Such agreements are unprecedented and unwise.

Previously, voter registrations were entered solely by election clerks, who have three important checks on their authority. These checks are: 1) they must be transparent subject to FOIA and open records laws; 2) they are geographically limited rendering audits manageable; and 3) they are politically accountable. No such checks apply to Rock the Vote.

Allowing such access creates new digital vulnerabilities easily allowing nefarious actors to access poll books and alter entries.

The Amistad Project's concerns were amplified by the nature of a contract offered by Michigan's health director to a subsidiary of NGP VAN, a Democrat fundraiser and data services company.

Michigan granted the COVID tracing contract to Michigan VAN as a subsidiary of NGP VAN. The contract allowed this leftist organization to demand sensitive information from Michigan citizens at the threat of arrest. Citizens could be ordered to turn over medical records, travel information, the names of associates and friends, and other information with a significant privacy interest and of significant monetary value to a political fundraiser.

Emails later obtained through FOIA requests demonstrate Governor Whitmer's political director was involved in suggesting to the health department that they not directly contract with NGP VAN because of possible political fallout. Governor Whitmer's staffer recommended NGP VAN create a Michigan subsidiary and that the subsidiary become a subcontractor so as to conceal NGP VAN's involvement. When this information became public, Whitmer claimed she was unaware of the agreement and faced with public pressure, she rescinded the contract.

At this time, The Amistad Project decided to retain the services of Stillwater and Mr. Carlson to develop this report. Stillwater has and will

continue to play a critical role in The Amistad Project's understanding of the privatization of the 2020 election.

Stillwater has engaged in extensive research of law, procedures, city documents, and public documents to reveal the workings of these private interests directing the 2020 election.

This report reveals those relationships and the method in which public officials partnered with private interests to improperly influence the 2020 election.

Managing elections is a core government function that cannot be trusted to private interests. We must not privatize our elections. Such privatization threatens democracy, silences the voice of the electorate, and undermines election integrity. These concerns should transcend party affiliation and this threat requires a bipartisan response. We will continue to expose these issues so our nation may adequately respond to this threat to the election process.

-- Phill Kline, Director of the Amistad Project of the Thomas More Society

AUTHORS PREFACE

Using the COVID-19 flu pandemic as justification and the excuse that local elections lacked funding to facilitate safe elections, a well-funded network of foundations and non-profit organizations gave hundreds of millions of dollars of private funding directly to counties and municipalities across Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania for electoral purposes.

The illegitimate infusion of private funding and third-party promotion of training, equipment, security, staffing and reporting programs by a network of private nonprofits at the local level bypassed state administrative processes, violated legislative prerogatives codified in state Help America Vote Plans (HAVA), and resulted in questions about the integrity of the US electoral system.

This report places in context and raises substantive questions about last minute gifting of private funding by five progressive, non-profit foundations and ten non-profit organizations into the local elections of swing states.

We begin by documenting longstanding federal and state authorities through which elections are to be funded and administered, factually demonstrating the adequacy and availability of public funding for the 2020 general election.

Because the availability of adequate public funding severely contrasted the narrative by the Center for Technology and Civic Life (CTCL) that private monies were needed for safe administration of public elections, we explored the background of CTCL and discovered a deep and integrated apparatus of progressive foundations and affiliated non-profits whose mission is to transition the bottom-up, electoral system of the United States to a top down, electronic system that centralizes voter information, interfaces with state registration databases, and promotes advocacy, all of which could, over time, have the capacity to exert strong local influence on the electoral processes of the United States.

It is not difficult for even the most casual of observers to conclude that the presence of private funding in public elections simply is not a good idea. In fact, the use of public/private partnerships for elections is neither wise nor legal, and if allowed to continue unchecked will create a dependency of local governments on funding from a select group of people who can afford to promote their own causes.

Our particular concern lies not with the influence of foundations and their cooperating non-profits, but instead with the elected officials who accessed the funding and Secretaries of State who understood - even enabled - the influence of non-profits to take place within their states.

We leave it to the readers of this report and those in authority to investigate our findings, buttress the existing electoral system, or take the necessary actions to ensure electoral processes are truly safe and secure.

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1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 Situation Appraisal -

Disruption of the 2020 US general election can be traced to infusion of private funding from non-profit foundations and organizations to local counties and municipalities of swing states. The injection of **hundreds of millions of dollars** in early summer of 2020 violated legislatively adopted regulatory plans, bypassed adequately funded state electoral programs, and resulted in an unbalanced distribution of funding among precincts.

The early infusion of funding and non-profit advisory services, when combined with errant directives from senior state electoral officials, confused and encouraged county officials into appointing untrained personnel, installing unapproved ballot processing equipment, illegitimately relocating precincts or ballot boxes, or otherwise making decisions that had a disparate influence on specific voting blocs of swing states. Ultimately, infusion of private funding brought about a nationwide level of confusion that has resulted in lawsuits that has led to a loss of confidence in the US electoral system.

This report explores the legitimacy, legality, and wisdom of blending the governmental administration of elections with the influence brought about by embracing private/public partnership through grants into elections. Historically, public officials have been skeptical of lowering the bright line distinction between the public and private sectors - and the example of disruption caused by private funding into Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania during the 2020 elections demonstrates why.

Having demonstrated the adequacy of existing federal appropriations and the soundness of the existing electoral framework, we then explore the background, structure, and mission of a foundation/non-profit apparatus whose mission is to erode confidence in US electoral processes, blend government and private sector functions, and gain access to state-by-state voter information.

Following a review of the adequacy of public funding and the structure and intent of non-profits and foundations to access state databases and influence elections, we then present data to demonstrate that the infusion of private funding in the 2020 election cycle had a disparate and political end – to increase the total number of votes in select Democrat leaning precincts.

1.2 State Electoral Authority; The Help America Vote Act -

The authority to administer state and federal elections is the sole prerogative of the Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and other state legislatures.¹ These state legislatures maintain authority to enact statutes, make fiscal appropriations, and delegate responsibility to executive electoral commissions - who in turn are responsible for the integrity, security, and administration of elections throughout the state.

¹ [U.S. Const. Art. I, § 4](#)

State electoral commissions who receive Help America Vote Act HAVA funding enact policies, support county and municipal officials in their individual precincts, and have a responsibility to administer policy in accordance with the HAVA and Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) mandates and standards. The mechanism for ensuring electoral policy administration at the state and county level is the legislatively appointed state HAVA implementation plan. The states of Michigan,² Wisconsin,³ and Pennsylvania⁴ all have a longstanding regulatory system based upon certified HAVA Plans that govern elections and implement electoral policies. For their part, counties and municipalities who receive HAVA funding are required to maintain HAVA compliance agreements with their respective state.

The state HAVA implementation plans contain specific requirements and protocols for: 1) ensuring the security and integrity of voter information systems; 2) effecting voter communication; 3) recruiting and training poll workers; 4) enacting plans to improve voter access; and 5) auditing and reporting under HAVA funding programs.^{5,6}

Preparation and revision of State HAVA implementation plans are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of the individual states. State APA procedures impose public notification, opportunities for public comment, and other protective, procedural constraints on electoral commissions before HAVA implementation plans may legitimately be enacted or substantively modified. Promoting or undertaking activities outside the HAVA system bypasses state APA procedures and violates state APA requirements.

1.3 Supplementary Funding for Administration of 2020 General Election -

On March 27, 2020, the Congress enacted the Coronavirus Aid Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act^{7,8} which appropriated an additional \$400 million dollars to the EAC for dissemination to the states:

“to prevent, prepare for, and respond to coronavirus, domestically or internationally, for the 2020 Federal election cycle.”

The CARES Act requires state agencies to coordinate with the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, and funding from the CARES Act was to be disseminated to counties through the HAVA state implementation system. In response to mounting election-related costs from COVID-19, some states appropriated even more funding for administration of county and municipal elections. In Wisconsin, the state legislature

² [Certified Michigan HAVA State Plan of 2003. Terri Lynn Land Secretary. FR Vol. 69 No. 57 March 24 2004](#)

³ [Certified Wisconsin HAVA State Plan of 2003. WI Elections Board. FR Vol. 69 No. 57 March 24 2004](#)

⁴ [Certified Pennsylvania HAVA State Plan of 2003. Edward Rendell Governor, P.A. Cortes Secretary FR Vol. 69 No. 57 March 24 2004](#)

⁵ [41 CFR Part 105-71. Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements with State and Local Governments](#)

⁶ [OMB Circular A 133 Audits of States, Local Governments and Non Profit Organizations, June, 2003](#)

⁷ [Elections Assistance Commission. Plans for Use of CARES Act Funds. Report to Pandemic Response Committee.](#)

⁸ [Federal Election Assistance Commission. Post Primary CARES Act Expenditure Report. September 22, 2020](#)

funded an aid program called *Wisconsin Routes to Recovery*.⁹ The *Routes to Recovery* program was enacted to reimburse local governments for unbudgeted expenditures due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In late November 2020, Wisconsin reported that of its 1,850 municipalities, only 1,265 had applied for CARES election funding. After the November general election, Wisconsin reported a CARES funding surplus of \$1,198,511.¹⁰ As of November 23, 2020, Pennsylvania reported surplus CARES funds of \$953,839.¹¹ As of this report, Michigan had not submitted a November report to the EAC as required; however, following the primary election Michigan CARES had a fund surplus of \$4,663,819.¹²

During the same timeframe, the Wisconsin municipalities of Racine, Madison, Milwaukee, Green Bay, and Kenosha actively pursued private grant funding from the Center for Technology and Civic Life (CTCL) for funding of elections expenses that included equipment, salary, training, and even a \$250,000 motor home.¹³ The grant applications, governmental approval documents, and other information was previously reported by STS.¹⁴

Because adequate funding for elections administration was available in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, the CTCL narrative that it needed to provide funding for safe and secure elections was at best naïve, and at worst, an outright falsehood. The presence of ample sources of public funding rendered the infusion of any private funding unjustified, unnecessary, and disruptive to electoral processes.

1.4 The Structure and Role of Non-profits in Affecting Elections -

Shortly following the inauguration of President Obama in 2009, a network of special-use non-profit organizations was created to collect, aggregate, and analyze information collected from third party users, such as Turbo Vote, who have access to state databases for the purpose of influencing US elections and electoral policy. These well-funded non-profits share leadership, are centrally coordinated, and have the common mission of amassing and analyzing voter information to influence campaigns, promote activism, and affect elections. Attachment A presents an organizational chart of foundations and non-profits involved in US electoral policy.

The multiple layered, special-use non-profit model also provides an outward appearance of strength, assures political cover for donors, and affords a convenient conduit to quickly channel funding to loosely knit street activists. This special-use non-profit apparatus is not unique to elections, as progressive activists have been using similar networks to influence public lands policy, for expansion of the environmental movement, and in influence of administrative government policy.¹⁵

⁹ [Guidance. Wisconsin Routes to Recovery Reimbursement Program. September 25 2020](#)

¹⁰ [Wisconsin Cares Nov 23 Report](#)

¹¹ [Pennsylvania Cares Nov 23 Report](#)

¹² [Michigan Cares Aug 24 Report](#)

¹³ [Wisconsin Safe Voting Plan](#)

¹⁴ [STS Timeline of Electoral Activities FINAL12/14/20](#)

¹⁵ [The Chain of Command. How Billionaires and Foundations Control Environmental Movement. US Senate Report July 30 2014](#)

The multi-level non-profit structure also affords a convenient way to shield donors, because non-profits can shift resources among themselves, making tracing and discovery more difficult and time consuming. Specialization also gives a perception of separation and impartiality, traits which are particularly important for those non-profits who seek to influence electoral policy, promote academic standards, or influence cyber security policy.

2.0 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

2.1 Focus Topics -

- 1) Whether state certified HAVA implementation plans or state legislative prerogatives were compromised through the infusion of private grants from the Center for Technology and Civic Life (CTCL) into local elections;
- 2) If appropriations from federal, state, or local sources were sufficient to completely fund the 2020 general election, rendering funding from public/private partnerships unnecessary;
- 3) Whether the reporting and claw back provisions in private grant agreements between CTCL and local governments presents a future audit, bonding, or pension liability to counties who received the CTCL grants.¹⁶

¹⁶ [41 CFR Part 105-71. Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements with State and Local Governments](#)

Private Non-profit Associations Involved in Elections - Policy

POLICY				
Organization	Function	Key People	Funders	
Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC)	- Governmental Association of State Secretaries - Access to motor vehicle information - Promotes centralized access and sharing of state registration and motor vehicle databases - Funded by states; subject to IRS Instrumentalities rules and FOIA	- David Becker - CEO - Pam Anderson - EO of Colorado County Clerks - Kevin Kennedy - Former Wisconsin Chief Election official	Democracy Works	
National Vote at Home Institute (NVHI)	- Promotes comprehensive at-home voting and mail-in balloting - Bypasses HAVA State Plans and commissions by providing privately generated “ tool kits” and “ calculators” to educate local officials in elections administration	- Co-Chair Jocelyn Benson, Michigan - Tiana Epps-Johnson - CTCL - Carolyn De Witt - Rock the Vote - Dana Chisnel - Center for Civic Design - Jake Matilsky - Center for Secure & Modern Elections - Jennifer Morrell - Democracy Fund - Seth Flaxman - Democracy Works	- Democracy Fund - Center for Civic Design - Rock the Vote	
Center for Technology and Civic Life (CTCL)	- Founded by Tianna Epps-Johnson - CTCL promotes national API interface agreements between federal, state, and local systems - Bypasses state HAVA training requirements by providing tool kits and education - Circumvents state appropriations by providing grant funding to local counties - Collects and analyzes voter information from local county clerks - Grants contain future liabilities for counties and present audit issues - Data sharing with Big Tech, Face Book, and Google	- Tiana Epps-Johnson - Executive Director and Founder* - Whitney May - Government Services Department* - Donny Bridges - Civic Data Department* <i>*previously employed by New Organizing Institute</i>	- Knight Foundation - Skoll Foundation - The Democracy Fund - Rockefeller Brothers Fund - Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan	
Center for Civic Design	- Research arm of electoral non-profits - Drives government policy through white papers, security standards, and science - Promotes intergovernmental data sharing and automatic voter registration	- Dana Chisnel - Director - Whitney Quesenberry - CTCL - Tiana Epps Johnson - CTCL - Katy Peterson - Democracy Works - Jennifer Morrell - Democracy Fund	- Democracy Fund - MacArthur Foundation - Center for Secure and Modern Elections - Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan	
Center for Secure and Modern Elections	- Election policy at state and local level - Promotes voter registration at state and federal government offices and during social program enrollment	Jake Matilsky - Director	New Venture Fund	

Private Non-profit Associations Involved in Elections -Advocacy

ADVOCACY				
Organization	Function	Key People	Funders	
US Vote Foundation	- Created in 2005; rebranded in 2012 - Third party aggregation of voter information - Maintains database of public officials for advocacy - Advocates for federal absentee voting - Data aggregator for other non-profits	Dana Chisnel	- Democracy Fund - Knight Foundation - Pew Trust - Carnegie - JEHI Foundation	
Democracy Works; dba Turbo Vote	- Promotes mail in and absentee voting for all 50 states - Targets and recruits college students - Collects and aggregates information from users accessing websites - Model integrated and replicated throughout several states (with name changes)	- Seth Flaxman - Also sits on NVHI Board - Trey Grayson		
Rock the Vote (RTV)	“ Rocky” actively recruits college students and inner-city youth for activism - Affiliated with 300 academic institutions and colleges - Collector and aggregator of information - Has third party access to Pennsylvania voter registration system - Promotes “ full integration” of state API registration databases - Remote access for batch loading of voter information	- Carolyn DeWitt - Director - Jeff Ayeroff - Founder <i>Board Members:</i> - Wayne Jordan - Michael Skolnick - DeRay Mckesson - National BLM Leader and Co-Founder of Campaign Zero and Our States.org. - Jesse Moore - Founder Common Thread Strategies		

3.0 CONFLICT ANALYSIS -

I. Injection of private funding into county and municipal elections circumvents State and Federal appropriations processes, violates protocols in HAVA state implementation plans, and results in inaccurate reporting under HAVA 254(a)(5):

- a. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) prescribes an intergovernmental administrative process that includes the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), state legislatures, and delegated state commissions.
- b. The authority for administration of HAVA mandates and for HAVA and CARES Act appropriation funding is prescribed in the Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania state certified HAVA plans.
- c. The individual state HAVA implementation plans incorporate detailed requirements for the 13 HAVA categories, including election security protocols; standards for voter systems; equipment procurement requirements; voter and electoral official training procedures; provisional voting and balloting processes; provisions to improve voting access; mail-in voter registration requirements; voter complaint resolution protocols; and appropriations monitoring, auditing and reporting protocols. The state HAVA implementation plans provide measures to upgrade voter systems, standards for database integrity, methods of voter communication, requirements for recruitment and training of poll workers, and many other policies to be implemented by elected officials at the local level.
- d. The claw back and reporting provisions in contracts between CTCL and local counties and municipalities, if exercised, will result in inaccurate recordkeeping and state reporting under *HAVA 254(a)(5)* and the *Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements with State and Local Governments at 41 CFR Part 105-71*.
- e. The claw back language in the CTCL agreements represents a long-term, contingent liability for counties and municipalities who received the CTCL grants. These liabilities pose long-term audit, bonding, or pension risks to those counties who received CTCL grants.
- f. Scaled up across the 15 states of known CTCL grant funding activity, the inaccuracies in state/federal HAVA Title II reporting and auditing resulting from unreported funding or claw back provisions is substantial.
- g. The appropriate mechanism for charitable donations for electoral purposes is through donations earmarked into the general fund of the individual state legislatures. There is no state or federal statutory authority for counties, municipalities, or other local electoral jurisdictions to solicit, receive, or appropriate private funding outside of state HAVA implementation plans.

II. HAVA, CARES, and state appropriations for local elections in Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania were sufficient to fund administration of the entire 2020 election cycle, rendering CTCL funding unnecessary:

- a. Public appropriations for federal elections through the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and state matching funds are the only legitimate funding sources for administration of U.S. elections. State-level funding formulas provide for proportional and equitable allocation of funds across electoral precincts, ensuring resources are evenly distributed so as not to result in funding disparities.
- b. For the 2020 general election, federal and state appropriations for administration of local elections were substantially augmented to account for the COVID-19 pandemic.
- c. Additional COVID-19 pandemic response funding for election administration was made available through state appropriations and similar allocations of public funding. As example, the State of Wisconsin used CARES Act funding and state matches for its *Routes to Recovery Program*.
- d. The combination of the HAVA and CARES Act funding, along with any state matches, was more than adequate for electoral operations, upgrade of election-specific hardware and software, cybersecurity, training for voter and elections officials, and COVID-19 specific needs. The infusion of private funding was unnecessary. (Tables 1, 2, and 3)
- e. Local electoral officials in Michigan who performed due diligence on CTCL grants observed the sufficiency of CARES Act funding and remarked as to the non-necessity of CTCL grants. As example, Michigan's Oakland County Clerk Lisa Brown decided not to seek CTCL funding stating: *"We already had an opportunity through the CARES Act to get extra equipment and things we would need at the county level. It seemed to me that they were offering up the same sort of thing."*¹⁷
- f. The December 2019 HAVA Title II 251 Report to the EAC from Michigan Secretary Jocelyn Benson documented an unexpended HAVA surplus for administration of statewide elections of \$1,285,975.¹⁸ The public record also indicates that Secretary Benson was aware of the availability of adequate public funding for dissemination to Ann Arbor, Flint, Lansing, East Lansing, Muskegon, Pontiac, Romulus, Kalamazoo, and Saginaw – jurisdictions that received CTCL grants.
- g. On April 13, 2020 Michigan Secretary Benson corresponded with the EAC and certified the use of \$11,299,561 CARES funding for COVID-19 electoral administration. This stands in stark contrast to Secretary Benson's public advocacy for CTCL and its funding, and ultimately the CARES funding solicited by Secretary Benson was unspent and supplanted by CTCL grants.¹⁹

¹⁷ [Benson accused of letting 'partisan operatives' influence election.](#) Detroit News. October 6, 2020.

¹⁸ [Michigan HAVA 251 Funds Report. December 2019.](#)

¹⁹ [Bureau of Elections. Audit Report Michigan Auditor](#)

- h. The 2016 IRS Form 990 for the Southern Law and Poverty Center lists Michigan Secretary Jocelyn Benson as the Director of that non-profit corporation.
- i. Concerns with CTCL funding include lack of public accountability, no state legislative or EAC oversight, and agreements that require reporting of voter information from county clerks back to a non-governmental organization.

Table 1 - HAVA and CARES Funding Plus State Matching Funds for 2020 Elections²⁰						
	2019 HAVA Carryover	Election Security	Match	CARES	Match	Total
MI	\$6,635,744	\$12,053,705	\$2,410,741	\$11,299,561	\$2,259,912	\$34,689,663
MN	\$6,548,440	\$7,418,672	\$1,483,734	\$6,958,233	\$1,391,647	\$23,800,726
PA	\$3,531,998	\$15,175,567	\$3,035,113	\$14,233,603	\$2,844,721	\$38,821,002
WI	\$4,316,403	\$7,850,124	\$1,570,025	\$7,362,345	\$1,472,469	\$22,531,366

Table 2 - Estimated CARES Act Expenditures 20 Days Post Primary Election²¹					
	Amount Appropriated	State Match	Initial Total Available	Estimated Expenditure	Available Funds
MI	\$11,299,561	\$2,249,551	\$13,549,112	\$6,821,392	\$6,727,720 49%
MN	\$6,958,233	\$1,386,122	\$8,344,355	\$363,867	\$7,980,488 92%
PA	\$14,233,603	\$2,831,101	\$17,064,704	\$3,511,525	\$13,553,179 79%
WI	\$7,362,345	\$1,472,469	\$8,834,814	\$3,228,484	\$5,303,330 60%

Table 3 – Government Funding and CTCL Grant Funding		
	2020 HAVA + CARES Funding²²	2020 CTCL Grants^{23, 24}
MI	\$28,023,919	\$6,369,753 (22.7%)
MN	\$17,252,286	\$2,297,342 (13.3%)
PA	\$35,289,004	\$15,824,895 (44.8%)
WI	\$18,254,963	\$6,946,767 (38.1%)

²⁰ [Election Assistance Commission—Election Security Grant Funding Chart July 16, 2020 and Election Assistance Commission—CARES Grant Funding Chart July 22, 2020](#)

²¹ [ESTIMATED CARES Act Expenditures As Reported in 20 Day Post Primary Reports \(September 22, 2020 Update\)](#)

²² Includes federal funding + state matching funds; does not include 2019 carryover.

²³ CTCL grant dollar amount accompanied with size as a percentage of total government funding for the state.

²⁴ CTCL grant values must be viewed as approximate because the numbers reported by news sources and local governments vary, and grant awards continue.

III. When evaluated in context of the 2016 presidential election, CTCL grant funding patterns demonstrate clear partisanship in grant funding awards:

- a. A review of data for the 2020 CTCL grant-making actions in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, along with 2016 presidential election voting records for recipients of CTCL grants reveals a distinct pattern of greater funding to jurisdictions where candidate Hillary Clinton won versus grant-receiving jurisdictions where candidate Donald Trump won. While CTCL maintains that it is a non-partisan organization and its grants are available to all local jurisdictions, the grant pattern is understood to have a distinct color of partisanship. Attachment B contains charts, graphs, and a table supporting this conclusion.
- b. **Michigan** - CTCL awarded eleven grants in Michigan. Recipient cities were Detroit (\$3,512,000); Lansing (\$443,742); East Lansing (\$43,850); Flint (\$475,625); Ann Arbor (\$417,000); Muskegon (\$433,580); Pontiac (\$405,564); Romulus (\$16,645); Kalamazoo (\$218,869); and Saginaw (\$402,878). In the 2016 election, only Saginaw was won by candidate Donald Trump; the remainder were won by candidate Hillary Clinton. In total, **\$5,939,235** was awarded to the ten jurisdictions where candidate Clinton won and only **\$402,878** where candidate Trump won.²⁵
- c. **Pennsylvania** - CTCL awarded seven grants in Pennsylvania. Three of these grants were awarded to the cities of Philadelphia (\$10,016,074); Erie (\$148,729); and Lancaster (\$474,202). Five grants were awarded to counties: Wayne County (\$25,000); Northumberland County (\$44,811); Center County (\$863,828); Delaware County (\$2,200,000); and Allegheny County (\$2,052,251). A total of **\$13,063,828** (94.7%) went to jurisdictions where candidate Hillary Clinton won in the 2016 presidential election; only **\$692,742** (5.3%) went to jurisdictions where candidate Donald Trump won in 2016.²⁶
- d. **Wisconsin** - CTCL awarded multiple grants to five Wisconsin cities: Milwaukee - two for a total of \$2,164,500; Madison - two for a total of \$1,281,788; Green Bay - two for a total of \$1,625,600; Racine - two for a total of \$1,002,100; and Kenosha - two for a total of \$872,779. The \$60,000 grant to Racine is what remained of a \$100,000 CTCL grant to that municipality which included a stipulation that Racine would distribute a \$10,000 sub-grant to each of the other four cities. This placed Racine in the position of being an agent for CTCL with the purpose of distributing grant moneys.^{27,28}

²⁵ [CTCL Grant Charts](#)

²⁶ [CTCL Grant Chart](#)

²⁷ [Wisconsin Safe Voting Plan. June 15, 2020](#)

²⁸ [CTCL Grant Chart](#)

IV. Systemic mismanagement of voter registration databases and verification processes in Michigan and Pennsylvania deprived voters in the 2020 general election of a free and fair election:

- a. Registration is the first essential step in verifying legitimate voters, and protection of the state registration database is necessary to ensure the accuracy of voter rolls. The secretaries of Michigan and Pennsylvania allowed flawed administrative procedures that gave third party access to state voter information in the QVF and SURE systems. The voter registration databases of both Michigan and Pennsylvania fail to fully comply with the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) standards required by National Institutes of Standards (NIST) for certified technologic security.
- b. HAVA established the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) which provides funding to states, sets requirements for administration of elections, and identifies NIST as the agency charged with setting performance standards for:
 1. Systems maintaining Personally Identifiable Information (PII) in voter registration databases, and;
 2. Voting systems allowing votes to be cast, tabulated, and reported.
 3. Requires states to ensure data exchanges between state drivers' registration and licensing databases and the Social Security Administration databases.
- c. HAVA Section 303, "*Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail*" requires those states receiving HAVA funding to **secure** their state-wide voter registration databases.
- d. HAVA Section 303(a)(5)(F) requires states receiving federal funds to **ensure protection of voter Social Security information**. This Section explicitly requires that protection protocols extend to all state employees and state contractors who have access to the Michigan QVF and Pennsylvania SURE systems.
 - 1 Michigan has entered into an API contract with the third-party, non-profit Rock the Vote (RTV) granting RTV remote access to the QVF database. As of 2020, the public record is silent on Michigan's certification that RTV has adhered to Michigan or NIST standards to protect information or assure compliance with Michigan technologic security standards. A review of the RTV contract indicates the last RTV audit was conducted in 2018. The absence a certification of compliance for RTVs access to QVF could pose a security risk to the state voter information system. There is no assurance that the voter rolls are only populated with legal, Michigan voters nor is there assurance that voter data has not been exfiltrated or misused.

2. A comprehensive review of Michigan's use of third-party contractors accessing the registration databases is needed, along with an Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI) risk review of Michigan election staff who have access to the registration database. The OCI review is a central component of NIST standards.
3. In 2005, the Pennsylvania Legislature certified a state HAVA plan that enabled access to federal funds. Pennsylvania then used federal funding to establish its Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors (SURE) system, the repository for sensitive voter information. The Pennsylvania state HAVA plan is silent regarding whether their SURE system is secure and correctly manages Social Security Administration (SSA) information as required by HAVA. In a press release dated September 2016, the non-profit Rock the Vote is documented to have an application linked to 25,000 "partners." The public record is silent as to how the Pennsylvania Secretary ensures certification of its registration system for RTV's 25,000 partners. Without public review, it is not possible to ascertain the security of the Pennsylvania SURE system under HAVA and NIST.
4. In an audit cover letter of the Pennsylvania SURE system performed between January 2016 and April, 2019 Pennsylvania Auditor General Eugene DePasquale issued a **scathing** letter to Governor Wolf of noncompliance of the SURE system with HAVA and federal auditing standards, excessive redactions by Pennsylvania Secretary of State, and impediments to the auditing process by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. The public record is silent as to whether in 2020 Secretary Boockvar remedied any of noncompliance issues prior to the 2020 election. Pennsylvania Secretary of State Boockvar has deep affiliations with far left voting related advocacy groups.²⁹

V. Michigan's 2020 electoral administration and tabulation of election results is fatally flawed and involves potentially fraudulent use of federal funds to implement and maintain their HAVA state Plan:³⁰

- a. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) prescribes an intergovernmental administrative process that includes the US election assistance Commission (EAC), state legislators and delegated state commissions. HAVA establishes the EAC, provides funding to states, sets requirements for election administration, and identifies the National Institute of Standards (NIST) as the agency charged with setting performance standards for voting systems.

²⁹ [Performance Audit Report Pennsylvania Auditor General 121919](#)

³⁰ FR Vol. 69, No 57. Wednesday, March 24, 2004; HAVA 101 (d), 301, 302, and 303.

- b. Based on the Michigan HAVA implementation plan the state obtained an excess of \$71 million in federal funding for fiscal years 2004 - 2006 to establish voter training, voting systems, and a statewide voter registration database.
- c. Section 101 (d) of HAVA specifies that funds are to be used to train election officials and poll workers. In section 905 (a) **HAVA describes criminal penalties for individuals who conspire to deprive voters of a fair election.** HAVA also cites the 42 USC 1973i (c), which defines coercion, blocking of poll locations, and other forms of **voter intimidation or denial of access or voting monitoring as being potential criminal violations.** Based on observed behavior captured on video and news reporting, Michigan poll workers, election officials, and election staff demonstrated a lack of training in conflict with the HAVA law and the 1965 Voting Rights Act of 1965.
- d. Registration is the first critical step in determining who in this state can vote in an election. Protecting the registration rolls of voters is the first critical step in assuring a legal, accurate, election result. HAVA section 303 (a)(3) requires a state to provide technological security of state-wide Social Security information of voters. **This section specifically requires these protections extend to all state employees and state contractors** who work with voter data. The State of Michigan, in its HAVA plan, states that the Department of Technology, Management, and Budget (DTMB) governs technology contracts in Michigan. **Michigan has entered into a state contract with Rock the Vote (RTV) granting that third party non-profit organization access to the QVF database.**³¹ As of mid-2020, there is no record that RTV has adhered to Michigan standards to protect voter information in the QVF, complied with Michigan technological security standards, or other standards that assures HAVA compliance. A comprehensive review of Michigan's use of third-party contractors assessing the registration is needed to assess the risk.

VI. Infusion of private funding into electoral processes has altered the times, manner and places established by HAVA Plans and longstanding electoral practices in which elections were conducted.

- a. In Wisconsin, an elector who is Indefinitely Confined due to age, physical illness, or infirmity - or is disabled for an indefinite period - may by signing a statement to that effect that an absentee ballot be sent to the elector automatically for every election. The application form and instructions are prescribed by the Wisconsin Elections Commission and must be furnished upon request to any elector by each municipality.³²

³¹ [Michigan RTV Contract](#)

³² [Indefinitely Confined Report](#)

- b. High Speed Tabulators, Scanners, High Speed Industrial Printers, and Electronic Poll Books funded by CTCL raise questions of certification, training, or disparate access due to their installment of some but not other locations.³³
- c. Election regulations in Michigan and the state HAVA implementation Plan detail training requirements for officers overseeing elections. Despite adequate funding from multiple public sources, poll workers in Detroit lacked adequate training, became frustrated, and walked off in response to training problems.³⁴
- d. In Michigan, the process used for acquisition of electoral equipment on a statewide basis violated state funding, procurement, and legislative budget committee approval processes, as legislators were left out of the process.³⁵
- e. CTCL funded **mobile** precincts used by election officials to collect ballots and register people to vote, resulted in a disparate, statewide access from precinct to precinct, favoring specific demographics.³⁶
- f. The establishment of satellite polling places on several college campus using CTCL funding occurred at multiple locations. These offices were not mapped, favored a specific age and demographic group of citizens, and were established outside of HAVA plans and protocols.
- g. CTCL funds created and funded an official position of election workers called “**Voter Navigators.**” The Voter Navigators were not approved positions according to the state electoral process.³⁷
- h. Unlike the HAVA Title I (303) requirement to maintain an electronic voter database in Michigan, **not one of the CTCL contracts - including those reviewed from swing and other states - included provisions for updating or purging of voter rolls.** A December 2019 Bureau of Elections report indicated more control was needed over the Qualified Voter File (QVF) system.
- i. In Detroit, poll watchers were instructed not to compare signatures on ballots, to back date the ballots, and to not require ID for people who were voting in person.³⁸
- j. A 2019 Michigan lawsuit filed by Pacific Interest Legal foundation found noncompliance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. Detroit had 2,503 dead people on its voter rolls, and 4,788 voters that were flagged for duplicate or triplicate concern. Detroit had 511,786 registered voters but only 479,267 adults designated as eligible to vote.³⁹ None of these items was addressed by Secretary Benson in a December 2019 Audit by the State of Michigan Auditors office.⁴⁰

³³ [Wisconsin Safe Voting Plan](#)

³⁴ [Detroit Training Issues](#)

³⁵ [Michigan Law Election Supplies](#)

³⁶ [Wisconsin Safe Voting Plan](#)

³⁷ [Wisconsin Safe Voting Plan](#)

³⁸ [Detroit Workers Did not Check Signatures](#)

³⁹ [Dead People on Voter Files](#)

⁴⁰ [Office of the Auditor General State of Michigan December 2019](#)

- k. Wisconsin, Green Bay, Kenosha, Madison, Milwaukee, and Racine **all added ballot drop boxes to facilitate the return of absentee ballots throughout their cities.**⁴¹ The locations and placement of ballot drop boxes raises questions of disparate access from precinct to precinct and across the state.
- l. In Detroit, Michigan, poll workers were restrained in their ability to verify signatures or handle ballots. The Michigan Election Law outlines the rules which were not adhered to in this process.^{42,43}

⁴¹ [Wisconsin Safe Voting Plan](#)

⁴² [Poll Watchers Denied Access](#)

⁴³ [Poll Watchers in Detroit Kicked Out](#)

4.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS -

The confusion and negative effect from illegitimate infusion of private funding in Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and several other states during the 2020 election can be shown to have had a disparate and inequitable impact on the electorate.

Although history is replete with examples of elite groups attempting to gain influence, the current incidence of CTCL and other private donors purposefully injecting hundreds of millions of dollars into swing states is troubling because county officials who should know better actually **accepted the grants, to the exclusion of abundantly available public funding**. Even the most casual of observers can understand that acceptance of *any* private funding for administration of public elections creates inequity, dependency, and the potential for collusion, or even fraud.

It seems odd that while CTCL promotes having nationwide expertise in elections and electoral policy, its funding of local counties and municipalities in the 2020 general election blatantly circumvented well-funded and legislatively adopted state and federal HAVA plans.

Perhaps even more troubling is the collaboration of the Michigan and Pennsylvania Secretaries of State and representatives who sit on the election commission of Wisconsin in promoting CTCL grants, granting access to databases, or otherwise promoting non-profit activities while subordinating CARES funding and HAVA state implementation plans. Several of these officials have longstanding affiliations with progressive non-profits and foundations who actively endeavor to collect voting information for purposes of affecting elections or altering electoral policies.

The presence of vast quantities of public funds for administration of the 2020 elections in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania raises questions as to whether CTCL and its supporting foundations understood that there **was no resource deficit** for administration of elections, including extra expenses due to COVID-19.

This warrants investigation.

Based upon the information in this report and related research, STS offers the following actions and activities for consideration:


1. The secretaries, attorneys general, and/or legislatures of states whose county governments received CTCL funds should commission a comprehensive, third-party audit of the consistency of private/public transactions with the HAVA implementation plans of their state. This should include compliance with NIST standards, and state procurement requirements.
2. State secretaries, attorneys general and/or legislatures who have membership in the non-profit **Electronic Registration Information Center** (ERIC) should audit the information access, collection, storage, security and/or potential voter information sharing practices of ERIC with other states or third-party non-profit associations.

3. In the fall of 2020, the Center for Election Innovation (CEIR) issued grants to state secretaries, local governments, and non-profit associations for election-related purposes. Secretaries, attorneys general, and/or legislators of states receiving CEIR grants should request and evaluate CEIR contracts for HAVA compliance and the fiscal and procurement requirements of their individual states.
4. CTCL is a non-profit organization chartered in Illinois but who has negotiated grant contracts with county and municipal governments in multiple jurisdictions across many states. The public record is silent as to whether CTCL is licensed in all the states in which it continues to conduct contractual business.
5. The claw back language in CTCL agreements with counties and municipalities who received grants represents a long-term, contingent liability and is subject to federal audit, bonding, or pension risks. County commissioners should coordinate with their respective attorneys general or legislatures to understand and mitigate potential future liabilities.

Attachment A

Flowchart:
The Relationship of Foundations
and
Non-profit Organizations Involved in US Electoral Policy





THE RELATIONSHIP OF FOUNDATIONS
AND
NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN U.S.
ELECTORAL POLICY

 FUNDING PATHWAYS
 POLITICAL CONNECTIONS

Note * Reported grant amounts to CTCL and CEIR vary widely



"Complex Problems Solved Well"

Attachment B

Charts, Graphs and Tables

Note: Variations in grant amounts were reported by editors, the press and in meeting minutes from local governments. These variations might result in perceived inaccuracies in the dollar amounts of some CTCL grants. Because CTCL continues to make grants, source information in these calculations will outdate. The data presented is sufficient and reliable to conclude clear political trends in CTCL grant awarding patterns.

Center for Tech and Civic Life's Grants to Democratic Strongholds in Battleground States

State of Wisconsin

City	CTCL Grant	Dem. Vote	Rep. Vote	Trump's 2016 WI Win	Trump's 2016 WI Win in Votes
Milwaukee	\$2,164,500	85%	14%	0.77%	22,748
Madison	\$1,281,788	70%	23%	0.77%	22,748
Green Bay	\$1,625,600	58%	42%	0.77%	22,748
Racine	\$1,002,100	72%	28%	0.77%	22,748
Kenosha	\$872,779	69%	31%	0.77%	22,748
Total CTCL WI Grant	\$6,946,767				

The five Wisconsin cities above accounted for 82% of Hillary Clinton's vote in 2016. CTCL's \$6.32 million grant to increase voter participation in only five of Wisconsin's 190 cities will produce a lopsided vote for Joe Biden in Wisconsin's five largest Democrat strongholds. If CTCL's \$6.3 million Wisconsin voter participation grant increases the Biden vote in just the five Democratic strongholds by 2%, then Democrat Joe Biden will win Wisconsin. CTCL's \$6.3 million Wisconsin grant deliberately increases Joe Biden's chances of winning Wisconsin's popular vote and 10 electoral votes.

State of Pennsylvania

City/County	CTCL Grant	Clinton	Trump	Trump's 2016 Pa Win	Trump's 2016 PA Win in Votes
Delaware County	\$2,200,000	65%	35%	0.72%	44,292
Philadelphia	\$10,000,000	92.1%	7.9%	0.72%	44,292
Centre County	\$863,828	48.71%	46.32%		
Wayne County	\$25,000	67.63%	29.18%		
Erie	\$148,729	48.57%	46.99%		
Total CTCL PA Grant	\$13,237,557				

CTCL's \$10 million grant to Philadelphia is three times higher than CTCL's second largest grant. CTCL granted Philadelphia more money than anywhere else because President Trump can't win his reelection if he doesn't win Pennsylvania's electoral votes. If CTCL's \$10 million voter participation grant increases just the Philadelphia Democratic voter turnout by 7.5%, then CTCL has flipped Pennsylvania for Democrat Joe Biden.

Hillary Clinton had her second largest winning percentage in Delaware County behind the City of Philadelphia. CTCL's Pennsylvania grants to Democratic strongholds in Philadelphia and Delaware County will play a significant role in determining whether Biden or Trump wins Pennsylvania.

State of Michigan

City County	CTCL Grant	Clinton Vote	Trump Vote	+ Clinton Votes	+ Trump Votes
Detroit	\$3,512,000	234,871	7,682	227,189	0
Lansing	\$443,742	65,272	22,390	42,882	0

City County	CTCL Grant	Clinton Vote	Trump Vote	+ Clinton Votes	+ Trump Votes
East Lansing	\$43,850	26,146	8,294	17,852	0
Flint	\$475,625	16,163	4,677	11,486	0
Ann Arbor	\$417,000	128,025	50,335	77,690	0
Muskegon	\$433,580	8,933	3,372	5,561	0
Saginaw		10,263	11,077	0	814
Pontiac	\$405,564	14,351	2,735	11,616	0
Romulus	\$16,645	7,573	3,078	4,495	0
Kalamazoo	\$218,869	18,644	5,456	13,188	0
Total CTCL MI	\$5,966,875	530,241	119,096	411,959	814

If CTCL's \$3.5 million Detroit grant increases Democrat Joe Biden's vote by 4.5% in just Detroit, CTCL's grant will have flipped Michigan from Red to Blue. CTCL's \$3.96 million in Michigan grants to Democratic strongholds in Detroit, Flint, Lansing and East Lansing increase Democrat Joe Biden's chance of winning Michigan's statewide and 16 electoral votes.

State of South Carolina

County	CTCL Grant	Clinton Vote	Trump Vote	Trump's 2016 SC Win	Trump's 2016 SC Win in Votes
Richland County	\$730,000	108,000	52,469	14.1%	300,016
Charleston County	\$695,000	89,299	75,443	14.1%	300,016

County	CTCL Grant	Clinton Vote	Trump Vote	Trump's 2016 SC Win	Trump's 2016 SC Win in Votes
Clarendon County	\$102,373	7,732	7,386		
Greenville	\$660,000	74,483	127,832		
Total CTCL SC Grant	\$2,187,373				

Republican Senator Lindsey Graham represents South Carolina and is on the November 3, 2020 ballot. CTCL's grants to South Carolina Democratic strongholds improperly increases Democratic votes in Richland and Charleston counties and makes President Trump and Senator Graham's reelection more difficult. State of Georgia

Georgia

County	CTCL Grant	Clinton Vote	Trump Vote
Fulton	\$6,000,000	297,051	117,783
Cobb	\$5,600,000	160,121	152,912
Dougherty	\$295,235	23,311	10,232
Dekalb	\$4,800,000	251,370	51,468
Total GA Grant	\$16,695,235	731,853	332,395

Fulton County is one of the most reliable Democratic Counties in the country. Since 1876 Fulton County has voted Democratic in every presidential election, except in 1928 and 1973. Of the State of Georgia's 159 counties, Hillary Clinton received more votes in Fulton County than any other Georgia county. Clinton beat Donald Trump by 180,000 votes in Fulton County.

Iowa

County	CTCL Grant	Clinton	Trump
Black Hawk	\$267,500	50.6%	43.3%
Scott County	\$286,870	47.5%	46%
Woodbury	\$156,000	57.4%	37.5%
Cerro Gordo	\$20,325	43.5%	51.2%
Floyd	\$7,302	39.8%	54.7%
Louisa	\$6,324	32.91%	61.28%
Total IA Grant	\$744,321		

Minnesota

City	CTCL Grant		
Minneapolis	\$3,000,000		
Total MN Grant	\$3,000,000		

New Jersey

County	CTCL Grant		
Atlantic County	\$150,000		
Total NJ Grant	\$150,000		

New York

County	CTCL Grant	Clinton Vote	Trump Vote
Onondaga County	\$286,960	53.89%	40.13%
Warren County	\$31,000	41.68%	50.15%
Tompkins County	\$69,000	67.69%	24.3%
Total NY Grant	\$386,960		

Warren County which voted for Trump in 2016 received the smallest CTCL grant.

Texas

County	CTCL Grant	Clinton Vote	Trump Vote
Dallas County	\$15,130,433	461,080	262,945
Bowie County	\$62,095	8,838	24,924
Hays County	\$289,000	33,224	33,826
Hopkins County	\$19,952	2,510	10,707
Cameroon County	\$1,800,000	59,402	29,472
Colorado	\$14,990	1,987	6,325
Bexar	\$1,900,000	319,550	240,333
Ellis	\$86,424	16,253	44,941
Williamson	\$263,644	84,468	104,175
Total Texas Grant	\$19,566,538	987,312	757,648

In 2016 Clinton won Dallas County by 137,284 votes. In 2016 Bowie County only had 33,4470 votes. Trump won Bowie County by 16,082 votes over Clinton. Trump won Hays County by 602 votes over Clinton. Trump won Hopkins County by 5,412 votes over Clinton.

Maine

Town	CTCL Grant		
Town of Union	\$5,000		
Total Maine Grant	\$5,000		

Maryland

County	CTCL Grant	Clinton	Trump
Washington	\$90,512		
Total Maryland Grant	\$90,512		

Arkansas

County	CTCL Grant	Clinton	Trump
Craighead	\$59,856		
Total Arkansas Grant	\$59,856		

Mississippi

County	CTCL Grant	Clinton	Trump
Hinds	\$1,500,000	71.39%	26.69%
Total MS Grant	\$1,500,000		

Ohio

County	CTCL Grant	Clinton	Trump
Lucas	\$544,624	56.10%	38.32%
Lorain	\$435,248	47.63%	47.54%
Franklin	\$975,188	60.43%	34.30%
Ashtabula	\$65,000	23,318	15,577
Total Ohio Grant	\$2,020,060		

Kansas

County	CTCL Grant	Clinton	Trump
Sedgwick	\$816,458	36.88%	55.28%
Total KS Grant	\$816,458		

Total CTCL Grants

State	Number of Grants	CTCL Grant Amount
Wisconsin	6	\$7,324,567

State	Number of Grants	CTCL Grant Amount
Pennsylvania	5	\$13,237,557
Michigan	8	\$6,106,599
South Carolina	3	\$1,527,373
Georgia	2	\$11,600,000
Iowa	6	\$744,321
Minnesota	1	\$3,000,000
New Jersey	1	\$150,000
Texas	7	\$19,216,470
New York	3	\$386,960
Maine	1	\$5,000
Maryland	1	\$90,512
Arkansas	1	\$59,856
Mississippi	1	\$1,500,000
Ohio	1	\$544,624
Total CTCL Grants	47	\$65,493,839

The first 26 CTCL grants went only to Democratic strongholds in swing states. CTCL claim that its grants are for the purpose of protecting voters from the COVID-19 pandemic is a blatant lie. CTCL hidden COVID-19 grant agenda is to increase the votes for Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden, Democratic U.S. Senate candidates and Democratic House of Representative candidates.

Encl.: [Appendix A](#) (summary of legal violations and evidence concerning 2020 election) and [links to the source documents](#).

[Appendix B](#) (report, “The Legitimacy and Effect of Private Funding in Federal and State Electoral Processes”)

[Appendix C](#) (1,400-page appendix listing evidence of election irregularities and lawlessness)

<https://got-freedom.org/evidence/>